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Modelling the effect of information feedback on
the spread of the Ebola virus
Bernadette O’Regan, Richard Moles
Centre for Environmental Research, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland (bernadette.oregan@ul.ie)
Abstract: This paper describes the application of the tools and techniques of the system dynamics method to
the complex problem of understanding the spread of the Ebola virus. The main deliverable of this research is
a computer simulation model in the system dynamics tradition. The essence of system dynamics is to act as a
framework for formalising mental models of a problem. In this respect, the system dynamics simulation
model presented here is a theory describing the structure of, and interrelationships between, the factors that
impact an outbreak of the Ebola virus and the attempts to contain it.
The model, comprising 57 interrelated variables, is structured to represent a group of rural villages served by
one local hospital, remote from regional and national medical laboratories. Such a structure typifies the
circumstances of recent Ebola outbreaks in central Africa. Model output examines the probable impacts of
changes in the system delays. These delays consist mainly of incubation delays, delays to disease
recognition, delays in travelling to hospital, delays to inform higher health authorities and delays to involve
the Centre for Disease Control in the US.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

The Ebola virus takes its name from the Ebola
River in northern Congo, where it first emerged in
1976. In this outbreak, 318 people were infected
and 280 died (Le Guenno and Galabru, 1997). On
average the disease has an 80% fatality rate
(Michie, 1999, Peters, 1997). Recent studies (Le
Guenno and Galabru, 1997) have identified four
strains of the virus, suggested by differences in
mortality and clinical expression.
The contamination risk is related to contact with
the body fluids of an infected person. This is most
likely during the nursing of patients and the
preparation of corpses for burial. Also, as the
disease kills so rapidly the risk of an epidemic in
developed countries is believed to be low (Sinha
and Powell, 1996).
Outbreaks tend to spread from one isolated case
and so individual behaviour and local customs
play an important role in the progress of each
outbreak of Ebola or a similar epidemic (Le
Guenno and Galabru, 1997). Initial cases leading
to secondary transmission to the person taking care
of the infected person are called ‘familial
outbreaks’. The tendency so far has been for the
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spread to ‘amplify’ when infected people enter
local hospital care without proper protective
equipment or hygiene rules and then ‘explode’ as
the virus spreads to general hospitals, as was the
case in the Kitwit (Zaire) outbreak in 1995
(Shears, 2000, Peters, 1997). These hospitals tend
to be ideal breeding grounds for disease due to the
poor training of staff, inadequate staff levels, poor
standards of hygiene, lack of analytical laboratory
equipment and only basic medicine (Shears,
2000).
2.

AVAILABILITY OF DATA

Recent outbreaks have confirmed data already
acquired by the World Health Organisation
(WHO) in 1996. Transmission is not airborne. It
requires close contact to a seriously ill patient that,
in most situations, results in a low infectiousness
rate. Therefore, isolation precautions and a change
in cultural customs can result in the containment of
the virus. The incubation period varies from 3
days and 3 weeks and when the patient has a lethal
form of the disease, death usually takes place

between 6 and 10 days from the initial onset of the
illness (Le Guenno and Galabru, 1997).

Figure 2 shows the behaviour over time graphs for
the spread of the virus in the local village. Note
that the number of sick people declines briefly
around day 40. This corresponds to the time when
the sick start to move into hospital.
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Figure 2. The spread of the virus in the local village
virus. The remainder of this paper
describes a simulation model
at which other people become infected in the
designed to capture the important dynamics of an
village is a function of how easy it is to become
Ebola outbreak. The model is developed in the
infected (the infectiousness rate), the rate at which
system dynamics tradition, with emphasis on the
an infected person comes in contact with other
importance of feedback and information delays.
people (the contact rate) and the percentage of
incubating and sick people already in the village,
defined as follows;
3. MODELLING AN OUTBREAK
For the purposes of the model, it is assumed that
the outbreak originates from a single isolated
incident on day 15 of the 150 day simulation
period. From Figure 1 it can be seen that this
random infection resulted in a total death toll of
192 people over the 150 days.
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Figure 1. Output from the standard run of the model
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further enhanced if it was ever necessary to
disaggregate these relationships.

the duration of the simulation, i.e. that they do not
return to the susceptible population.

ContactRateInVillage and InfectiousnessInVillage
are more difficult to quantify, however, these
variables are important so they must be included in
the model. It is also necessary to estimate how
many new people might an infected person living
in a remote African village meet each day. The
standard run of the model as shown in Figure 1
assumes a contact rate of 1, i.e. an infected person
meets one new person each day. However,
evidence suggests that once the cause of the
epidemic is identified exposed populations are
warned of the dangers of coming in contact with
infected persons and so the contact is not a
constant but instead declines over time and is
defined as follows;

3.1
The Local Hospital: Some of the sick
people choose to go to the local hospital for
treatment. It is assumed that at the start of the
epidemic nobody goes to hospital in the belief that
the sickness will be treated in the local community.
Only when it becomes apparent that the virus
cannot be treated locally do people turn to the
hospital for help.
TransferRateToHospital is defined as;
SickInVillage * LocalAwarenessOfVirus * 0.5
where it is assumed that at most 50% of sick
people go to hospital and then only when at least 5
local people have already died.

ContactRateInVillage = 1 * ( 1 - BarrierNursing )
where BarrierNursing, expressed as a percentage,
is taken to represent a type of disease containment
using isolation techniques implemented by the
national disease surveillance unit or the CDC
during
each
Ebola
outbreak
to
date.
The
InfectiousnessRate,
meaning
the
infectiousness of each contact between a
susceptible and an incubating or sick (infectious)
person, is defined as 0.15. This figure was arrived
at through extensive sensitivity analysis, based on
available data from historical
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Ebola outbreaks.
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A value of 8 days was
chosen for the incubation
period and the number of
people getting sick each day
in the village is then defined
as;

3.2
Exploring Scenarios: As already stated,
it is not the contention of the authors that the
assumptions put forward in this paper are
necessarily correct. Supposing for example, as
might be the case in practice, that the
infectiousness rate in the hospital is twice that in
the local village. Figure 3 shows the outcome of
modifying the standard run to reflect this
assumption. In this instance, the death rate in the
local hospital increases to 450 people.
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Figure 3. Higher infectiousness rate in local hospital
where
DeathFraction
is
assumed to be 80% and LengthOfSickness to be 6
Note also that the death rate in the village also
days.
increases, to 35 people, even though the
infectiousness rate in the village stays the same.
People who don’t die, but remain in the village,
This is because people continuously return home
become ‘survivors’, as defined by the
to the village after being treated for other illnesses
SurvivalFraction (1 – DeathFraction).
It is
and some of these have become infected during
assumed for the purposes of this model that
their stay in hospital.
survivors remain immune to the virus, at least for
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This last point raises a number of other
possibilities. For example, the local hospital
serves many villages. Patients can return home to
the other villages infected with the virus, thus
further spreading the epidemic. The array feature
of the Powersim modelling software was used to
extend the model to simulate five villages, each of
which were served by the same local hospital. For
this run, the hospital population was increased to
1000 to reflect the larger catchment area.
Now suppose that the virus mutates and the
incubation period increases to 60 days. Under
such a scenario, 1500 people would die in hospital
over the period of 1 year (see Figure 4) and a
further 240 deaths in the villages.
A higher incubation period for such a devastating
virus as Ebola could destroy the entire local
population were it not for outside intervention.
The model could be further expanded to include a
regional or national hospital sub-system but again,
for simplicity, this was not attempted here.
Instead, HospitalAwarenessOfVirus (modelled on
LocalAwarenessOfVirus), is used as a basis for
forwarding specimens and clinical data to the
regional or national laboratories and ultimately the
CDC. There are a number of critical information
delays in this process.
An information delay represents the process of a
gradual, delayed adjustment of information
moving towards the value being supplied by the
source. The model considers four (cumulative)
sources
of
delay,
namely
DelayToAnalysisOfBloodSamples,
DelayTo
InvolveCDC,
DelayInRecognisingEbola
and
DelayInEnforcementOfBarrierNursing.
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It is known from experience that it takes 5 days for
the CDC to diagnose Ebola. Once diagnosed, it
can take up to 1 week for CDC and WHO experts
to arrive at the scene of the outbreak, locate all
people exposed to the virus and enforce barrier
nursing and encourage other protective measures.
The delay to analysis of blood samples and the
delay to involve the CDC are functions of the
number of ‘tiers’ between the local hospital and
the eventual diagnosis of the virus. In some
African countries attempts have already been made
to improve diagnosis facilities and, in such cases,
there may be no need to involve the CDC.
However, the standard run of this model assumes a
delay of 5 days for each of these variables. The
number of decisions to be made (the number of
levels of authority to be called upon) impacts the
nature of the delays in the system.
The standard run of the model assumes a total
information delay of 22 days before barrier
nursing was fully in place. Suppose for example
that the virus could not be diagnosed or that the
CDC did not get involved. In such circumstances,
the initial regional population of 6,000 is reduced
by 66%. Virtually everyone in hospital is dead.
All that prevents total annihilation is the
assumption that survivors remain immune.

Now assume that our understanding of the virus
improves to the extent that Ebola is diagnosed in
the local hospital by the time the 5th patient dies (a
very
unlikely
scenario
under
current
circumstances). Figure 5 shows model output
under this scenario.
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Figure 4. 60 day incubation period simulated over 12 months
because of the delay between
the 1st and 5th deaths.

4

4.

Following on from this point, consider the
scenario whereby the virus can be diagnosed
in the local hospital once the first patient
becomes sick. Under this scenario, the total
death rate is restricted to 10 people (see
Figure 6).
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CONCLUSIONS

“System dynamics models do not, of course,
permit one to predict the future. Rather, the
objective is experimental. It is to assemble the
diverse bits of quantitative and qualitative
information already available and evaluate which
data are the most important in understanding the
system as a whole.” [Randers,
1973, p51]
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documentation to form a more
transparent and dynamic tool for
hypothesis testing. More specifically;
• Through a quantitative analysis of existing
data, the model exposes, within the context of
the problem area, the underlying assumptions
used as a basis for system understanding.
Through the compression of time, the model
provides a means of taking these assumptions
to their logical conclusions.
Exposing
assumptions in this way leaves less room for
misinterpretation and provides a solid basis for
enhancing the understanding of system
structure.
• The behaviour-over-time graphs used to
present model output provide a
powerful means of exposing
Figure 6. Ebola diagnosed on 1st sickness in hospital
system complexity and, thus,
increasing understanding.
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this complexity, as assumed by the model, is made
explicit through the variable definitions. These
definitions can be modified and the resulting
changes in behaviour patterns examined.

Sinha, G., Powell, C.S., (1996), “Shaking the
Ebola tree”, Scientific American, August,
http://www.sciam.com/explorations/082696explor
ations.html.

This model, linked to a GIS, will provide an aid
for health workers dealing with the Ebola virus
and attempting to estimate the behaviour of a
possible epidemic under a variety of situations.
This is becoming increasingly important with the
growth of travel to these remote regions and with
the movement of refugees between countries
(Kalipeni and Oppong, 1998, Freedman and
Woodall, 1999).

Vick, K., (2000), Washington Post Foreign
Service, October 14, ppA24.

Finally, the model aims to encapsulate best
practice in the field of system dynamics. It
emphasises the difference between actual and
perceived conditions as a basis for action. It
makes explicit the underlying assumptions as a
basis for further expansion. It highlights system
structure as a catalyst for change.
5.
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